Lockouts: A New Dimension in Collective Bargaining by Ross, Nelson G
Boston College Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 4 Article 4
7-1-1966
Lockouts: A New Dimension in Collective
Bargaining
Nelson G. Ross
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nelson G. Ross, Lockouts: A New Dimension in Collective Bargaining, 7 B.C.L. Rev. 847 (1966),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol7/iss4/4




Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in American Ship Bldg. Co.
v. NLRB,' the validity of the "bargaining lockout" 2 under the National
Labor Relations Act was a matter of disagreement among the circuit
courts of appeal' and legal analysts.`` Some viewed the bargaining
lockout as the employer's legal counterpart to the union's strike weapon,
while others considered the bargaining lockout illegal. In deciding
American Ship Bldg., the Supreme Court dealt with the very balance
of power between labor and management in the collective bargaining
process. Of the three decisions' in the field of labor law handed down by
the Supreme Court on March 29, 1965, American Ship Bldg., which
received the least predecision publicity, may well be the most significant
for the future of collective bargaining, for its rationale has the potential
to affect virtually every collective bargaining relationship.'
In writing this article, it is my purpose to analyze the status of
the bargaining lockout in the statutory scheme. The article will include
an analysis of the existing law prior to American Ship Bldg. and an
examination of the Supreme Court's decision: why the Court upheld the
validity of the bargaining lockout, what the decision means for the
* B.S., Boston University, 1960; LL.B., Boston College Law School, 1964; Mem-
ber, Massachusetts Bar Association; Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, Albany,
New York. The views expressed herein are the author's and must not be taken as the
official pronouncement of the Board or its General Counsel.
1 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
2
 As used throughout this article, the term "bargaining lockout" is intended to mean
the voluntary temporary cessation of operations by an employer during collective bar-
gaining negotiations which precludes the employees from working, the purpose of which
is to enhance the employer's position at the collective bargaining table.
3 Compare NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962) and
Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), with Body & Tank
Corp. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964); see American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB,
331 F.2d 839 (D. C. Cir. 1964); Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n v, NLRB,
294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961); Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3rd
Cir. 1959).
4 See generally Koretz, Legality of the Lockout, 4 Syracuse L. Rev. 251 (1953);
Koretz, The Lockout Revisited, 7 Syracuse L. Rev. 263 (1956); Meltzer, Lockouts Un-
der the LMRA: New Shadows on an Old Terrain, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 614 (1961) ;
Meltzer, Single and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 70 (1956). These articles provide an extensive treatment of the status of the
lockout in the statutory scheme prior to American Ship Bldg, supra note 1.
5 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 1; NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278
(1965); Textile Workers v. Darlington Mills, 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
6
 Approximately 100,000 collective bargaining agreements involving almost 40%
of all employees represented by unions are negotiated annually.
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future of collective bargaining and what questions were reserved for
future resolution.
IL STATUS OF BARGAINING LOCKOUT PRIOR TO AMERICAN
SHIP BUILDING
A. Under National Labor Relations Board Decisions
Prior to American Ship Bldg., the employer's purpose in shutting
down was the factor determining the legality of a lockout. Lockouts
fell into three classes.
The first category was the case in which the employer used the
lockout as a means to destroy or to undermine the collective bargaining
representative, to frustrate organizational efforts or to evade the duty
to bargain.' The employer's motive in these circumstances rendered
the lockout unlawful, since it fell within the specific proscriptions of
Sections 8(a) (1), (3) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Acts
The second type of case dealt with the implementation of a lockout
for "defensive" purposes. The employer's purpose in shutting down here
was "to safeguard against . loss where there is reasonable ground for
believing that a strike was threatened or imminent.'
Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc." was a case frequently cited for this
proposition. Nineteen automobile dealers had bargained as a group for
many years with a union which represented their service department
employees. In the instance in question, the parties began negotiating
and bargained in good faith to an impasse. During negotiations, au-
thority to strike was sought and received by the union from its Inter-
national. Anticipating a strike, the dealers issued instructions to their
service departments not to accept work that could not be turned out the
same day and to complete any large jobs then in the shops. The associa-
tion was informed that the union had authority to strike if the parties
had not concluded a new agreement by the expiration of the existing
contract. The parties agreed that the dealers' final offer would be sub-
mitted to the union's membership for a vote and that the association
would be informed of the results. The employees voted to turn down the
last offer and to strike two of the dealers, beginning on the following
day. The dealers were informed of the result of the vote on their final
offer and were warned that the union would probably strike, but they
7 NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3rd Cir. 1952) ; NLRB v. Somerset Classics, 193
F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1952); Olin Indus. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1951); Joseph
Weinstein Elec. Corp., 59 L.R.R.M. 1015 (1965) ; American Int'l Aluminum Co., 56
L.R.R.M. 2682 (1964); J.R. Simplot Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 171 (1963); Industrial Fabri-
cating Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162 (1957).
8 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (3), (5) (1964),
0
 Quaker State OH Ref. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334, 337 (1958).
10 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
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were not informed when, where or against which dealers. Rather than
waiting to be struck, the dealers shut down, locking out their employees.
Upholding the legality of the lockout under the circumstances
presented, the Board stated that
an employer is not prohibited from taking reasonable mea-
sures, including closing down his plant, where such measures
are, under the circumstances, necessary for the avoidance of
economic loss or business disruption attendant upon a strike.
... The nature of the measures taken, the objective, the
timing, the reality of the strike threat, the nature and extent
of the anticipated disruption, and the degree of resultant re-
striction on the effectiveness of the concerted activity, are all
matters to be weighed in determining the reasonableness under
the circumstances, and the ultimate legality, of the employer's
action."
Finding that the dealers in Betts were faced with the reasonable threat
of a strike, and that occurrence of such a strike would cause the
dealers operating difficulties, the Board concluded that the lockout was
a legitimate protective measure.
The circumstances in which the Betts special "economic considera-
tions" rule has been applied are diverse. There are, however, generally
two factors present in all such cases: the reasonable threat of a strike"
and the potential harm over and above the usual effects attendant upon
any strike." Thus, the Board has sanctioned the lockout in cases where
the strike would have (1) caused the contractors to suffer contractual
penalties for failure to complete their work on time, and would have
caused inconvenience and endangered the public health and safety
through extended use of detours and disruptions of public services;"
(2) resulted in financial loss from spoilage of perishable goods ; 15
(3) caused damage to customer relations due to the employer's inability
to complete the servicing of its customers; 16
 and (4) caused recurrent
work stoppages in an integrated enterprise, preventing the employer
from properly planning production schedules and thereby making con-
tinued operations uneconomical.'
11 Id. at 286.
12 Cf. J.R. Simplot Co., supra note 7; Hercules Powder Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 333
(1960); American Brake Shoe Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 820 (1956) (Board found no threat of
imminent strike existed).
la The severity of the consequences from the strike necessary to bring the lockout
within the Betts rule has been reduced in recent years almost to the point where it is no
longer a factor.
14 Building Contractors Ass'n, 138 N.L.R.B. 1405 (1962).
15 Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
16 Packard Bell Elec. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1961).
17 Marydale Prods. Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1961); International Shoe Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 907 (1951).
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A distinctly separate type of "defensive" lockout arose in cases
where a multi-employer bargaining group was faced with a "whipsaw"
strike.' In such cases, the lockout by non-struck members of the group
was considered a legitimate protective measure. Since a whipsaw is a
strike against less than all of the members of the group, it is regarded
as an attack upon the integrity of the multi-employer unit. It raises the
further possibility that other members of the group will be successively
and individually struck. If the employer were unable to counter the
whipsaw, the members of the group would be denied the advantages of
multi-employer bargaining and the bargaining unit would be destroyed.
The Board, adhering to the Supreme Court's decision in Buffalo Linen,")
viewed a lockout by non-struck members as a legitimate defensive
measure. Prior to American Ship Bldg., the existence of a validly con-
stituted and recognized multi-employer unit was, however, a prerequisite
to a determination that the lockout by non-struck employers was lawful.
Where the larger bargaining unit was not validly established and
recognized, a lockout claimed to be in defense of a whipsaw strike was
deemed to be an illegal offensive weapon:2° .
The third class of cases into which lockouts fell was the bargaining
lockout—the use of the lockout to enhance the employer's bargaining
position in collective bargaining negotiations. Unlike the second class
of cases dealing with defensive lockouts, the employer's motive here was
not to protect himself from the consequences of a strike, but rather to
exert pressure upon the union to abandon its contract demands and to
accept the employer's proposals. As such, it was regarded as an offensive
weapon. Although the employer's motive was not such as to bring the
lockout within the specific provisions of Section 8(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act,' the Board consistently held that the bargaining
lockout was unlawful."
The Board reasoned that the employees were being locked out
because they exercised their statutory right to bargain collectively. It
follows that the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the employer's
conduct was to infringe the employees' right under section 7 to bargain
collectively" and to be free from employer discrimination based upon
18 A "whipsaw strike" is a strike by a union against less than all of the members
of a multi-employer bargaining unit with whom it has a collective bargaining relationship.
19 NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
20 Evening News Ass'n, 145 N.L.R.B. 996 (1964); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 145
N.L.R.B. 361 (1963).
21 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964).
22 See cases cited note 20 supra.
23 Section 7 of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. if 157 (1964),
provides that: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization . . . to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted




the exercise of such right.24 The fact that the lockout pre-empted the
use of the strike weapon was the alternate basis upon which the Board
rested its proscription of the bargaining lockout. Since it rendered the
strike weapon impotent, the Board reasoned that the bargaining lockout
contravened the language of section 13 of the act which specifically
protects the right to strike from infringement. 25 As such, the bargaining
lockout, in the Board's view, violated sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the
act. Moreover, the threat to shut down and the carrying out of that
threat during negotiations were considered by the Board as inconsistent
with the duty to bargain in good faith. 2° The Board considered such
actions to be unwarranted and illegal pressures "creat[ing] an atmo-
sphere in which the 'free opportunity for negotiation' contemplated by
the Act did not exist.""
In so finding the bargaining lockout unlawful despite the absence
of a specific illegal motive, the Board was performing a function which
it believed Congress had committed to it—the function of balancing
the conflicting legitimate interests of the employer and his employees.
The basis for such an interpretation of the Board's role in this area was
the Supreme Court's decision in Buffalo Linen.28 In 'upholding the
Board's finding that non-struck members of a multi-employer unit had
the right to lock out in defense of a whipsaw strike, the Court in that
case proceeded to explain the role of the Board in this complex area of
economic conflict. Frequently, the Court concluded, the legitimate
interests of the employer and his employees collide, and a decision as
to which interest is paramount must be made: Congress had committed
to the NLRB, subject to limited judicial review, the striking of this
balance to effectuate the act's policy. In establishing the illegality of
the bargaining lockout, the Board was thus exercising a function which
it believed the Supreme Court had interpreted as within its scope of
responsibility.
24 Employer conduct which discriminates against employees because they exercise
their rights guaranteed by § 7 of the act violates §§ 8(a) (1) and (3) of the act, 49 Stat.
452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (3) (1964), which provide:
§ 158. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. . . .
25 Section 13 of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 457 (1935), as amended, 29 	 § 163 (1964),
provides that, "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein,
shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
20 American Brake Shoe Co., supra note 12.
27 Id. at 833.
28 NLRB v. Truck Drivers, supra note 19.
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B. Under Circuit Court Decisions
A definite split of opinion concerning the legality of the bargaining
lockout existed among the circuit courts of appeals prior to American
Ship Bldg. Four circuits upheld the Board's theory on the matter. 29
On the other hand, two circuits rejected the Board's dichotomy between
offensive and defensive lockouts, regarding both types as legitimate
weapons of economic warfare."
In Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 31 the employer partially
suspended operations at its oil refinery the day after its collective
bargaining agreement with the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers had
expired. The company advanced two reasons in justification of its
work stoppage: First, the shutdown was dictated by plant and personal
safety, in defense against a reasonable strike threat; second, the shut-
down is a legitimate economic weapon, the employer's counterpart to
the union's strike weapon. The Board found that the company had
locked out in support of its bargaining position and not in anticipation
of a strike, and concluded that such a bargaining lockout violated
sections 8 (a) (1) , (3) and (5) of the act.'
The Third Circuit, in enforcing the Board's order, stated that the
language of the Supreme Court in Buffalo Linen defined the limits of
its reviewing power: that is, the primary responsibility for balancing
legitimate conflicting interests resides with the Board, subject to
limited judicial review. The court examined the Board's decision in
light of those restrictions. The Board had concluded that the bargaining
lockout accorded the employer an unfair advantage and thus distorted
the bargaining process. The lockout lessened or even destroyed the
effectiveness of the strike weapon, specifically protected by section 13
of the act. The Board had further noted that the employer possesses
other means of economic warfare to combat a strike and to pressure for
more favorable contract terms." Granting the employer the right to
lock out in addition to these other available courses of action would
unduly tip the balance of power too far in the employer's favor.
On the basis of these considerations, the Third Circuit concluded
that the Board had acted in accordance with congressional intent in
2ti Body & Tank Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 3; American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB,
supra note 3; Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, supra note 3;
Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 3.
ato NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., supra note 3; Morand Bros. Beverage Co.
v. NLRB, supra note 3.
31 Supra note 3.
32
 Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334 (1958).
33 The employer may replace economic strikers, NLRB v. McKay Radio & Tele-
vision Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), and may institute changes in terms and conditions of
employment which he urged in good faith at the unsuccessful negotiations, NLRB v.
Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
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balancing the conflicting interests involved, and that its proscription
of the bargaining lockout should stand.
The Tenth Circuit," the District of Columbia Circuit," and the
Second Circuit," espousing the Quaker State view that the Board
possesses the primary responsibility for balancing the parties' legiti-
mate conflicting interests, also sustained the Board's proscription of
the bargaining lockout.
Only the Fifth Circuit, in NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp.,"
rejected the Board's ruling on the bargaining lockout. A marginal
company, Dalton Brick, was in severe financial difficulty at the time
that its collective bargaining agreement with the United Stone and
Allied Products Workers expired. The parties had enjoyed a good
relationship with no strikes or strike threats for many years. Due to
its financial position, the company sought to renew the expiring con-
tract, while the union pursued increased benefits. During negotiations,
the company laid off its work force with the understanding that the
employees could return to work when the employer's bargaining terms
were agreed upon. The facts showed that the company bargained in
good faith and that, in shutting down, it was not actuated by anti-union
animus. The Board found that the primary purpose of the lockout was
the enhancement of the employer's bargaining position and the ultimate
acceptance of its proposals by the union.
While accepting the Board's finding, the Fifth Circuit could not
disregard the company's financial plight and the necessity, in light
thereof, that it obtain a strong bargaining position through a lockout.
Considering the Board's rationale as establishing the proposition that
a lockout is prima facie unlawful unless justified by special circum-
stances, the court stated that the act does not support such a presump-
tion with respect to a bargaining lockout. Its illegality must be estab-
lished, if at all, by an analysis of specific sections of the act and the
application of the facts thereto. Not only does the act not outlaw lock-
outs, but the fact that there are limitations placed on its use in several
sections of the statute demonstrates that, at least in certain other
situations, the lockout is a legitimate economic weapon. A lockout is
illegal only where it contravenes a specific section of the statute, e.g.,
where it is used to subvert the collective bargaining process.
In the court's opinion, two Supreme Court decisions" determined
that the Board must set forth a statutory basis for policies which it
34 Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractor's Ass'n v. NLRB, supra note 3.
85 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 3.
36 Body & Tank Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 3.
87 Supra note 3.
88 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v.
Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
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deems necessary in balancing legitimate conflicting interests between
labor and management. This constitutes a recognition, declared the
court,
that the objective—the collective bargaining agreement—is
by the very nature of things an annealing process hammered
out under the most severe and competing forces and counter-
acting pressures. Unless Congress has proscribed a given pres-
sure, or unless its exertion or manner of its exercise collides
with some other specific policy of the Act, its use may not be
transmuted to make what is in fact good faith at the bargain-
ing table into something else."
Thus, to establish a violation of section 8(a) (3), for example, it must
appear that, in locking out its employees, the employer was motivated
by a desire to discourage union membership and not merely by an in-
tent to gain the favorable resolution of a bargaining conflict.
Only where the facts of a particular case establish that the lockout
violated the specific provisions of sections 8 (a) (1), (3) or (5) has the
employer "tipped the scales" and acquired an unfair advantage. Absent
such a finding, a lockout is not illegal merely because it accords the
employer a bargaining advantage or removes an advantage from the
union.
III. AMERICAN SHIP BUILDING
The American Ship Building Company was engaged in the highly
seasonal business of repairing ships used in Great Lakes shipping. The
company's busy season was the winter months when navigation was im-
possible. While there was only a small amount of summer work, it had
to be expedited so that the ships could return to service as rapidly as
possible.
The company and a group of eight unions had a collective bargain-
ing relationship dating back to 1952. In the ten-year period since
1952, five collective bargaining agreements had been consummated
between the parties, and all five had been preceded by a strike. On May
1, 1961, the unions notified the company of their intent to seek modifi-
cation of their contract due to expire on August 1, 1961.
Central economic issues divided the parties during the more than
two months of negotiations which followed. The parties finally sepa-
rated on August 9, 1961, after extensive negotiations, with no plans for
future meetings. The union proposed a six-month extension of the exist-
ing contract or, in the alternative, an indefinite extension of the con-
tract with any new agreement retroactive to August 1. Although the
39 NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., supra note 3, at 895.
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existing contract contained a no-strike clause, the company rejected all
proposals for an extension of the contract. On the basis of the fore-
going, the trial examiner concluded that the parties had reached a bar-
gaining impasse. Throughout the negotiations, the company had ex-
pressed a fear that the union would either strike or delay negotiations
until the peak season, when the company would be most vulnerable
to work stoppage pressure. While assuring the company that it hoped
to conclude an agreement without a strike, the union did admit that
it lacked complete control over its membership with respect to a strike.
Because of the threat of a wildcat strike and the consistent deliberate
work stoppages in prior negotiations, management remained apprehen-
sive that a strike would occur.
The company decided to lay off part of its work force because of
the failure to conclude an agreement. The employees were notified that
they were laid off until further notice because of an unresolved labor dis-
pute. They were recalled to work immediately after the parties reached
agreement on October 21, 1961.
Unfair labor practice charges were filed against the company
alleging that the lockout unlawfully discriminated against the em-
ployees in violation of sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the act.° The trial
examiner found that the company was in reasonable apprehension of a
strike41 and concluded that the lockout was not unlawful since it was
implemented as a defensive measure to avoid the "peculiarly harmful
economic consequences of a work stoppage." 42 The fact that the com-
pany's additional motive in locking out its employees was to break the
bargaining impasse was considered irrelevant.
In a three-to-two decision, the NLRB rejected the trial examiner's
finding with respect to the existence of a reasonable apprehension of a
strike. 43 The Board concluded that since the sole object of the lockout
was to exert economic pressure to secure a favorable settlement of the
dispute, the lockout was in violation of sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of
the act.
The court of appeals viewed the situation as one of balancing the
conflicting legitimate interests involved. Enforcing the Board's order,
the court concluded that the balance struck by the Board should
40 While a § 8(a) (5) charge alleging a refusal to bargain was also filed, the Board
did not pass on it since the parties had long since reached agreement and no purpose
would be served by the entrance of a bargaining order.
41 Although the unions had given assurances that no strike would be called, past
bargaining history was considered sufficient to warrant the apprehension that a strike
would occur despite the assurances.
42 The economic consequences would have been severe both to the employer and
its customers if a strike had occurred either when a ship was in the yard during the
shipping season or when the yard was full during the nonshipping season.
43 American Ship Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963).
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stand." The company petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Be-
cause certain circuits had rejected the Board's theory on lockouts, the
Board did not oppose the petition. The Court accepted certiorari on the
issue "whether an employer commits an unfair labor practice under
. sections [8(a) (1) and (3)] of the Act ... when he temporarily lays
off or 'locks out' his employees during a labor dispute to bring economic
pressure in support of his bargaining position.""
Mr. Justice Stewart, as spokesman for the majority, narrowed the
scope of the Court's decision concerning the legitimacy of the bargain-
ing lockout to a situation where an impasse has been reached in nego-
tiations." He also made it clear that the decision should not be con-
strued as encompassing situations where the lockout is used for the
purpose of injuring a labor organization or evading the duty to bar-
gain.'"
Addressing itself to the issue of whether the bargaining lockout
violated section 8(a) (1), the Court noted that the Board's position—
that the lockout punishes the employees for presentation and adherence
to their bargaining representatives' demands, and that it thus coerces
them in the exercise of their right to bargain collectively—is untenable.
Absent evidence that the lockout was implemented to serve ends inimi-
cal to collective bargaining or to discipline employees for seeking to
secure their statutory rights, a conclusion that an employer's intention
was to destroy or frustrate the process of collective bargaining is un-
warranted. The employer's purpose to resist bargaining demands and
to seek acceptance of terms more favorable to him is not inconsistent
with or hostile to the rights of employees to bargain collectively. Nor
does the lockout involve action which is inherently so destructive of
collective bargaining that examination of the employer's motivation can
be dispensed with.48 While the pressure exerted by the lockout may
cause employees to alter their bargaining positions, the right to bargain
collectively does not include any "right" to insist on one's position free
from economic disadvantage."
The majority also rejected the Board's alternate basis for proscrib-
ing the bargaining lockout, that the weapon interferes with the right
to strike, since it permits "the employer to pre-empt the possibility of
a strike and thus leave the union with 'nothing to strike against.' " 5°
While recognition of the lockout deprives the union of the sole control
over the timing and length of work stoppages, said the Court, nothing
44 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 3.
45 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 1, at 301-02.
46 Id. at 308.
47 Ibid.
45 See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
49 380 U.S. at 313.
50 Id. at 310.
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in the act confers upon the union exclusive control over such matters.
The right to strike is nothing more than the right to cease work. While
the union's bargaining power would be greatly enhanced if it alone pos-
sessed power to control the time and duration of work stoppages, there
is no justification for such a restriction in the statute.
The Court then proceeded to consider the 8(a) (3) issue. To con-
clude that the bargaining lockout violates section 8(a) (3), it must be
established that there was both discrimination and a resulting dis-
couragement of union membership. Since there are numerous employer
actions which serve legitimate business objectives and, at the same
time, tend to discourage union membership, the employer's motivation
will normally determine whether a violation of section 8(a) (3) has
been established. Where the employer's purpose is to injure the collec-
tive bargaining representative, to evade the bargaining responsibility
or to otherwise further designs inimical to the process of collective
bargaining, unlawful motivation (anti-union animus) is established.
There are certain situations where specific evidence of anti-union ani-
mus need not be shown. In these instances the action is inherently so
prejudicial to union interest and so devoid of significant business jus-
tification that the employer's asserted lawful purpose cannot be cred-
ited." The majority concluded that the lockout was not so destructive
of union membership while serving no legitimate business end, render-
ing unnecessary a finding that the employer was motivated by anti-
union considerations.
The sole purpose of American Ship Building's lockout was to pres-
sure the union to alter its bargaining demands. The natural tendency
of the lockout is not to discourage union membership, while serving no
legitimate employer interest, and though the employees suffered eco-
nomic disadvantage as a result of the union's adherence to demands
unacceptable to the employer, the same is true of many actions an
employer may take in a bargaining situation."
In summary, the facts in American Ship Bldg. demonstrate that
the company's sole purpose was to obtain a favorable resolution of the
bargaining conflict in which it was involved, a legitimate objective.
The statute does not accord employees the right to press their bar-
gaining position free from economic pressure. Therefore, the sole inten-
tion to obtain a favorable settlement of a labor dispute does not con-
stitute the required unlawful motivation indigenous to an 8(a) (3)
finding.
The majority referred to certain provisions of the statute and its
legislative history as support for its rationale. The lockout was spe-
51
 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra note 48.
52
 NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., supra note 33 ; NLRB v. McKay Radio
& Television Co., supra note 33.
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cifically prohibited by section 8(1) of the original version of the act.'
Criticism in the Senate committee hearings was leveled against the pro-
vision as according unfair treatment to employers in that the lockout
was specifically proscribed, while the strike was specifically protected.
Deletion of the specific reference to "lockout" in section 8(1), noted
the Court, raised the reasonable inference that the lockout was not to
be regarded as per se unlawful.
Further, the fact that specific reference to lockouts appears in
certain other sections of the statute dealing with the bargaining process
indicates that such sections contemplate that lockouts will be used in
some fashion in a bargaining context. 51 Specific determination concern-
ing the legality of the lockout must rest upon analysis .of sections
8(a) (1) and (3), since the scope of the lockout is not defined by other
sections of the act.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice White regarded the case as
merely involving an employer who, in anticipation of a strike, lays off
his employees for the purpose of safeguarding his property and pro-
tecting his relationship with his customers. Such a "defensive" lockout
would be legitimate under existing Board and court precedent." Since
the majority did deal with the legitimacy of the bargaining lockout,
however, Justice White proceeded to express his views on the majority
decision. His remarks were not addressed to an analysis of the bargain-
ing lockout as such, but rather to an explication of his view of the role
of the Board in determining the legality of the conduct of a party to
a collective bargaining relationship. He viewed the balancing of "con-
flicting legitimate interests" as the recognized function of the Board.
The legality of the bargaining lockout, in the opinion of Justice White,
called for application of such expertise by the Board, and he viewed
the majority opinion as an usurpation of this function.
A second concurring opinion, in which the Chief Justice joined,
was written by Mr. Justice Goldberg. In agreement with Mr. Justice
White, Justice Goldberg concluded that the lockout in American Ship
Bldg. was a legitimate defensive measure designed to avert peculiarly
harmful consequences from a threatened strike. Justice Goldberg like-
wise proceeded beyond the merits of the case to comment upon the
majority opinion. Regarding as variant the types of situations in which
sa Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act 3 (1935).
53 Section 8(d) (4) of the act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(4) (1964), requires that certain notice procedures be complied with before
resort to a lockout or a strike; § 203(c) of the act, 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(c)
(1964), directs the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to seek voluntary resolu-
tion of labor disputes without resort to strikes or lockouts; §§ 206 and 208 of the act,
61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 176, 178 (1964), authorize the President to take certain
emergency procedures to forestall threatened strikes and lockouts.
55 Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., supra note 10.
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an employer might seek to lock out his employees, he called for a case-
by-case analysis in dealing with the legality of the lockout as an eco-
nomic weapon. This "evolutionary process" would take into account
such factors as the length, character and history of the collective bar-
gaining relationship, together with resolution of the existence of a
bargaining impasse, in determining the legality of a lockout in a par-
ticular case. Justice Goldberg also agreed with Justice White that the
majority had disregarded the role of the Board in the statutory scheme
—the balancing of "conflicting legitimate interests."
In sustaining the Board's position on the bargaining lockout, it is
evident that the four circuit courts viewed the Board as performing the
balancing function ascribed to it by Congress and recognized by the
Supreme Court in Buffalo Linen. The Board in Buffalo Linen had sanc-
tioned the right of employers to lock out, although this diminished the
effectiveness of the union's strike weapon. The Board, with the ap-
proval of the Supreme Court, had balanced the conflicting interests
and determined that the employer's interest in protecting himself
against the adverse consequences of a whipsaw strike outweighed the
employees' countervailing interest in maintaining the effectiveness of
the strike weapon. The Board struck the balance, and the Court stated
that such was the Board's responsibility.
It is difficult to understand how the Board and four circuit courts
could so misconceive, if indeed they did, the Court's apparently clear
statement of the Board's role in this area of labor law. It is the opinion
of the writer that, in concluding that the bargaining lockout was illegal,
the Board was following the mandate of the Supreme Court in Buffalo
Linen, but that the Courts which decided Buffalo Linen and American
Ship Bldg. had markedly different views concerning the Board's role
in this sensitive area of collective bargaining. The main thrust of the
concurring opinions in American Ship Bldg. was that the Court was
disregarding and indeed usurping the function of the Board to balance
conflicting interests. The question now arises, in view of American Ship
Bldg., whether—and, if so, in what situations—the Court has left to
the Board authority to balance conflicting legitimate interests.
Subsequent to Buffalo Linen, the Supreme Court decided NLRB
v. Insurance Agents,' which foreshadowed the Court's changing phi-
losophy in regard to the Board's role. The Board had determined that
a union which otherwise bargains in good faith may nevertheless re-
fuse to bargain collectively because, during negotiations, it seeks to
exert economic pressure upon the employer to yield to its bargaining
demands by sponsoring on-the-job conduct designed to interfere with
the carrying out of the employer's business. The Supreme Court re-
56 Supra note 38.
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jected the Board's per se finding and in so doing examined the Board's
role in the context of collective bargaining negotiations. When the
Board declared a particular economic weapon per se unlawful, the
Court said, it was establishing itself as the arbiter of permissible eco-
nomic weapons. The Court did not believe that Congress intended the
Board to seek to establish a balance of power between the parties to
collective bargaining negotiations. Such a practice, in the Court's view,
would permit the Board to exert considerable influence upon final terms
reached by the parties, a result not intended by the framers of our
national labor policy. The Court went on to reaffirm its statement in
Buffalo Linen that it is the function of the Board to balance conflicting
interests where that is the ultimate problem. The Court concluded,
however, that in Insurance Agents' the Board's action amounted not
to a resolution of interests which the act has left to it for a case-by-case
adjudication, but to a movement into a new area of regulation which
Congress never committed to it: the definition of "what economic sanc-
tions might be permitted negotiating parties in an 'ideal' or 'balanced'
state of collective bargaining." 57
The question arises whether, in proscribing the bargaining lockout,
the Board was attempting as in Insurance Agents' to achieve a balance
of power between the parties. It is clear that such was not the Board's
motive. Rather, the Board was attempting to balance the conflicting
legitimate interests of the parties, the interest of the employer to exert
economic pressure upon the employees to enhance his bargaining posi-
tion and the interest of the employees to engage in their rights guaran-
teed by section 7 of the act.
IV. QUESTIONS RAISED BY AMERICAN SHIP BUILDING
Frequently, a Supreme Court decision raises more questions than
it answers. This is especially true in American Ship Bldg. where the
Court rejected the Board's rationale on a significant segment of its law
on lockouts and left in doubt a large body of case law developed by
the Board in that area. While the decision sets forth broad statements
of policy, the question arises, how broadly should the Court's language
be applied? Is the case only as narrow as its facts or is it as broad
as its rationale? As cases with different facts arise, the Board and the
courts will necessarily have to interpret and apply the Court's broad
statements of policy.
In addition to sanctioning the bargaining lockout after an impasse
is reached, the decision leaves unaffected the law in those cases where
the lockout is used for purposes specifically proscribed by section 8(a)
of the act: e.g., to evade the duty to bargain collectively, 58 to injure the
67 Id. at 500.
68
 American Stores Packing Co., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 46 (1966).
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collective bargaining representative or to punish employees for exer-
cising their statutory rights. The use of the lockout for such purposes
is unlawful, and therefore Board cases in this area remain unaffected
by American Ship Bldg.
The most obvious question to arise is whether the existence of an
impasse was crucial to the Court's holding. The two circuit courts which
have had occasion to consider the issue since American Ship Bldg. have
held that the bargaining lockout is a permissible economic weapon re-
gardless of the fact that it occurred prior to an impasse. After the Sec-
ond Circuit decided Body & Tank Corp. v. NLRB,' the Supreme
Court decided American Ship Bldg. On the basis of American Ship
Bldg., the company petitioned for a rehearing. The court granted the
petition, withdrew its earlier decision and set aside the Board's order,
citing American Ship Bldg. as precedent." The Board petitioned for a
rehearing, requesting that the case be remanded for reconsideration in
light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court. The petition
was premised upon the absence of an impasse in the negotiations.
Despite this fact, the Board's petition was denied.
The Sixth Circuit, in Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v.
NLRB," also considered the importance of an impasse to the
Supreme Court's holding. Originally, the Board had found the em-
ployer's lockout unlawful," but following American Ship Bldg., the
Board requested that the case be remanded for consideration in light
of that decision. The Sixth Circuit also declined to remand the case to
the Board. In the course of its decision, the court stated that while an
impasse existed in American Ship Bldg., that case did not merely add
another exception to the Board's category of permissible lockouts. Re-
jecting the Board's finding that the lockout violated section 8(a) (1),
the court noted that there was no allegation that the lockout was used
in the service of designs inimical to collective bargaining, that the em-
ployer was hostile to the union or in any way attempted to interfere
with the employees' right to bargain collectively, or that it was de-
signed to discipline the employees for adhering to their union's
demands. The court regarded the following facts as support for such
conclusions: The parties had a Tong record of dealings; there was no
disposition manifested by the employer to refuse to bargain; and no
animus was exhibited toward the union or its members. The only issue
between the parties concerned the terms of their collective bargaining
agreement.
69 339 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964).
60 34-4 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1965).
61 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965).
62 145 N.L.R.B. 996 (1964).
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With respect to the 8(a)(3) finding of the Board, the court re-
garded the intention merely to bring about a favorable settlement of a
labor dispute as insufficient to establish the required unlawful intent
for an 8(a) (3) violation.
The Board's petition for certiorari was granted. The Supreme
Court vacated the court's judgements and remanded the case to the
court with instructions that the case be remanded to the Board for
further consideration in light of American Ship Bldg."
To conclude that a lockout before impasse is unlawful, it would
have to be shown that such a lockout impaired the rights of employees
more than a lockout after an impasse in bargaining. While on the facts
of American Ship Bldg., the absence of an impasse may not have altered
the Supreme Court's holding, its importance as a factor should depend
upon the circumstances of the particular case. Under certain conditions,
for instance, the absence of an impasse may evidence an employer's
unlawful motive in shutting down, especially where the employer and
the union are negotiating their first contract and during the union's
organizing campaign the employer exhibited anti-union animus.
As previously noted, prior to American Ship Bldg., the existence
of a validly established and recognized multi-employer bargaining unit
was a prerequisite to a finding that non-struck members of such a group
faced with a whipsaw strike may lawfully lock out. Absent such a unit,
a lockout to combat a purported whipsaw strike was considered unlaw-
ful, since there was no larger bargaining unit to protect. The Board
recently re-evaluated the status of a lockout by non-struck employers,
where the multi-employer bargaining unit was defective, in light of
American Ship Bldg." The trial examiner had found the existence of
a valid multi-employer bargaining unit and concluded that the lockout
by non-struck members in defense of a whipsaw strike was lawful under
Buffalo Linen. The Board found it unnecessary to pass on the trial
examiner's factual conclusion that the association existed, functioned
and was accepted by the unions as a multi-employer bargaining unit
for two reasons: The association did serve as the designated bargaining
representative of the employers, and all members of the group reached
an impasse in bargaining with the unions over certain economic issues.
The Board concluded that whether designed to protect the integ-
rity of the multi-employer bargaining unit or to enhance the employers'
bargaining position, the lockout was a lawful weapon. Referring to the
Supreme Court's language in American Ship Bldg. that inquiry into the
employer's motivation for locking out following an impasse could not
be dispensed with, the Board noted that there was no contention that
ea Newspaper Drivers Union v. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, 86 Sup. Ct.
543 (1966).
64 Weyerhaeuser Co., 60 L.R.R.M. 1425 (Nov. 16, 1965).
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the employer had "used the lockout in the service of designs inimical
to the process of collective bargaining, [or] . . . evidence . . . [or]
finding that the [employers were] hostile to [their] employees banding
together for collective bargaining or that the lockout was designed to
discipline them for doing so."" Even assuming that the multi-employer
unit was invalid, where "two or more employers bargain jointly with
a union, [and] an impasse in negotiations is reached over a mandatory
subject of bargaining, and the union strikes only some of the employers
engaged in such joint bargaining"" the lockout by non-struck employ-
ers is lawful since it lacks the discriminatory motive while serving a
"significant employer interest."
As noted by the Board, the impasse must occur with respect to a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Since it is a refusal to bargain to
insist upon a non-mandatory subject of bargaining, should a lockout
occur after a deadlock has been reached on a non-mandatory subject,
the lockout in all probability would not be considered a legitimate eco-
nomic weapon.'
While American Ship Bldg. involved a lockout by a single em-
ployer, there is little doubt that a lockout by a multi-employer group
to enhance its legitimate bargaining position under the same circum-
stances would not have altered the result reached by the Supreme
Court.
Whether the fact that a lockout occurs in a context of unfair labor
practices is alone sufficient to render the lockout unlawful was recently
presented to the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Golden State Bottling Co."
The existing contract between the union and the employer was sched-
uled to expire on March 31, 1963. The parties negotiated throughout
the month of March but were unable to conclude an agreement by the
expiration date of the existing contract. At the last union meeting, the
employees rejected the employer's proposal and the group that voted
against acceptance, led by the officers of the incumbent union, began
to solicit membership for a rival union. Upon reporting for work on
April 1, the employees were informed that they would not be permitted
to work without a contract. The employer repeated its proposal and
urged the employees to accept it. The group favoring acceptance of the
offer, still loyal to the incumbent union, was told by the employer that
it would have to have officers sign any new agreement. After conferring
with the incumbent union's attorney and being told that they could
elect new officers, the group loyal to the incumbent union agreed to
accept the employer's proposal, elected new officers and signed the new
65
 Id. at 1426.
ou Ibid.
07
 NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., supra note 33.
68 353 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1965).
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contract. The former officers of the union were the only two employees
not permitted to return to work immediately after the new agreement
was signed. The reason the employer would not permit them to return
immediately was because the men had refused as the union's officers to
sign the employer's contract proposal. Subsequently, one of these
former officers was discharged because of his activities on behalf of
the rival union.
The Board had concluded that the employer violated sections
8(a) (1) and (3) because of its discriminatory treatment of the union's
former officers. In addition, the employer's conditioning continued em-
ployment upon the employees' acceptance of its proposals and forcing
the employees to elect new officers to sign the contract, was considered
by the Board to constitute interference with the internal administra-
tion of the union in violation of sections 8(a) (1) and (2) of the act.
The court sustained the Board's findings that the employer vio-
lated sections 8(a) (1), (2) and (3) of the act. In the court's view,
however, this, in and of itself, was insufficient to transform an other-
wise legitimate lockout into unlawful conduct. To sustain a finding that
the lockout is bad, the court held, the Board must show more than a
lockout and contemporaneous unfair labor practices. While the lockout
in the instant case did have the effect of disrupting the internal admin-
istration of the union, such was not a necessary consequence of the
lockout and did not necessarily destroy the union's capacity for effec-
tive and responsible representation. In the absence of evidence that
the employer was wrongfully actuated in locking out or that the dis-
ruption within the union was a necessary consequence thereof, the
court could not find that the lockout was unlawful.
Of vital significance was a statement by the court with respect to
that part of the Board's 8(a) (2) finding which it sustained. Noting
that it was inappropriate for the employer's general manager, with full
knowledge of the split within the union, to tell one of the factions what
to do, the court stated that the general manager sought the bargaining
benefits of a lockout but was unwilling to assume its burdens. His con-
duct demonstrated an unwillingness to cease operation and a desire to
go to any extent to keep the plant open despite the announced shut-
down. The court then stated that "the legal course open to him was to
hire temporary replacements for the locked out employees."" Of the
several important questions raised by American Ship Bldg., the most
crucial one was merely touched upon in passing by the Ninth Circuit:
Having locked out to enhance its bargaining position, may an employer
hire either temporary or permanent replacements and thereby continue
to operate?
69 Id. at 670.
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On the same day that it decided American Ship Bldg., the Supreme
Court handed down its opinion in NLRB v. Brown." The Court ruled
that the non-struck members of a multi-employer group faced with a
whipsaw strike were permitted not only to lock out (Buffalo Linen)
but also may continue to operate with temporary replacements. The
Court regarded such conduct as a legitimate defensive measure de-
signed to preserve the multi-employer group from the harmful effects
of a whipsaw strike." The question arises in light of Brown and Amer-
ican Ship Bldg. whether the Supreme Court would sanction the replace-
ment of locked out employees following a bargaining lockout.
The Court in Brown emphasized the defensive nature of the em-
ployer's action in the face of a whipsaw strike—the protection of the
integrity of the bargaining group. Under such circumstances, while the
whipsaw strike may thus fail, "this does not mean that the employers'
conduct is demonstrably so destructive of employee rights and so de-
void of significant service to any legitimate business end that it cannot
be tolerated consistently with the Act. 772 Unlawful motivation need not
be shown in cases where, upon balancing the prejudicial effects of the
employer's conduct upon the employees against the employer's asserted
business purpose, it is clear that the conduct is directed at the em-
ployees and not to accomplish the asserted legitimate objective.
" [C]onduct so inherently destructive of employee interests could not
be saved from illegality by an asserted overriding business purpose
pursued in good faith."73 The Court in Brown did not consider the em-
ployers' conduct so destructive of employee rights, while failing to
serve an important business objective, that specific evidence of an
unlawful intent could be dispensed with in finding a violation.
70 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
71 In Acme Mkts., Inc., 61 L.R.R.M. 1281 (Feb. 28, 1966), the Board, relying on
American Ship Bldg. and Brown, extended the doctrine enunciated in Buffalo Linen that
non-struck members of a multi-employer unit may lock out their employees in defense
of a whipsaw strike. Acme, a retail food chain, had both unionized and non-unionized
stores. Acme's unionized stores were part of a multi-employer bargaining unit. When the
union engaged in a whipsaw strike against the multi-employer unit by striking Acme,
the other members of the group shut down their stores, locking out their employees.
This left Acme's unorganized stores operating in areas where non-struck members of the
unit had voluntarily closed down. Acme thereupon closed its non-unit stores in the area
where they were in competition with other members of the bargaining unit. The Board
ruled that the lockout of non-unit employees was a legitimate defensive measure designed
to protect the integrity of the multi-employer unit, Drawing a comparison to Brown, the
Board noted that if the employer had not locked out its non-unit employees, the non-
struck members would have been deterred from closing their stores as part of the group's
defensive lockout and the whipsaw strike would almost certainly have destroyed the
multi-employer unit. Like the replacement by non-struck employers in Brown, the layoff
of non-unit employees was designed to equalize the economic position of struck and non-
struck employers in the face of a whipsaw strike and thus serves a legitimate business end.
72
 NLRB v. Brown, supra note 70, at 286.
" Id. at 287.
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While, under the circumstances of Brown, the tendency to dis-
courage union membership may have been comparatively slight, and
while the company's conduct was reasonably adapted to accomplish a
legitimate business objective, replacement following a permissible bar-
gaining lockout would raise different considerations. No longer would
the employer's objective be the protection of a legitimate right (bar-
gaining on a multi-employer basis) from attack. A business purpose
to gain a bargaining advantage (continuation of operations) would
certainly not be accorded the deference paid to the defensive end sought
to be accomplished in Brown. Whether on balance, however, the ad-
verse effects upon employee rights caused by temporary replacement
following a bargaining lockout will be deemed to outweigh the em-
ployer's business purpose will, in all likelihood, have to be answered
by the Supreme Court, since that Court appears to want to strike the
balance.
Since Brown only involved the use of temporary replacements, the
question remains whether the Court in Brown would have reached a
different conclusion had the employer permanently replaced his locked
out employees. The answer to this question is also important in deter-
mining whether the employer may permanently replace following a
bargaining lockout. While a permanent replacement may be motivated
by the employer's subjective desire to further a legitimate business end,
the devastating consequences wrought upon the rights of employees
and union membership, and the lack of necessity to permanently (as
opposed to temporarily) replace the locked out employees, should
render such action per se unlawful. Such is the theory supporting the
Supreme Court's holding in Erie Resistor,' that super-seniority offered
to strike replacements and to strikers who would abandon the strike
is unlawful despite the absence of subjective unlawful motivation. A
less severe measure, temporary replacement, is available to the em-
ployer to accomplish the same lawful end—the continuation of opera-
tions.
V. THE VALIDITY OF THE BARGAINING LOCKOUT: ITS
EFFECTS UPON THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP
Attempting to foresee the consequences in the economic-nonlegal
sense of the Supreme Court's holding in American snip Bldg. raises
several considerations.
The National Labor Relations Act is founded upon several coun-
tervailing policy considerations, two of which are relevant to this dis-
cussion. A primary purpose of federal labor law is the achievement of
industrial stability and thus the continuous, unimpeded flow of goods
74 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra note 48.
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and materials in commerce. Existing coextensively with this policy
consideration is the necessity that labor and management retain the
ability to take measures designed to accomplish legitimate objectives.
The existence of economic weapons such as the strike and the lockout,
which create work stoppages and thus impede the free flow of com-
merce, are justified in view of the legitimate objectives of such actions.
Considering the effects of a bargaining lockout, the Supreme Court's
decision will not further industrial stability. In the opinion of the
Court, however, the necessity that the employer have the right to en-
gage in a bargaining lockout outweighed countervailing policy consid-
erations.
Besides the exercise of the bargaining lockout itself, there is a
second reason why the Court's decision will not promote industrial sta-
bility. Prior to American Ship Bldg., the union retained exclusive con-
trol over the timing of any work stoppage designed to exert economic
pressure during collective bargaining negotiations. Under such circum-
stances, the union would normally negotiate until the parties reached
an impasse and, if agreement were not in sight, attempt to time its
strike to occur when the employer was most vulnerable. Negotiating
to the point of impasse was desirable from the union's standpoint since,
if it could gain a favorable resolution of the bargaining conflict without
a work stoppage, it was in its best interests to do so. Assuming that the
existence of an impasse is a requirement before an employer may
legally lock out, the union will have reason to consider striking before
an impasse is reached. Before an impasse, the union will retain ex-
clusive control over the timing of the work stoppage and thus will still
be able to strike at the time within that period when it regards the em-
ployer as most vulnerable. If it waits until an impasse has been
reached, the union will run the risk that the employer will create the
work stoppage at a time that it is least vulnerable to economic pressure.
In view of these considerations, strikes may occur earlier than they
would have occurred prior to American Ship Bldg.
The large number of collective bargaining agreements which are
negotiated annually" would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court's
decision is most significant. However, the bargaining lockout should be
accorded significance commensurate with the actual role it will play in
negotiations. The existence of the weapon, in and of itself, will have
•some meaning, but despite its theoretical significance, close analysis
indicates that the bargaining lockout will be an infrequently used
weapon. The importance of the bargaining weapon and the frequency
of its use are integrally related to the relative strengths of the parties
to the collective bargaining relationship. We must start with the prem-
75 See note 6 supra.
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ise that an employer will lock out only when he stands to gain from the
work stoppage. Where a union is in a relatively stronger financial posi-
tion than an employer, it is doubtful that the employer would lock out:
Since the union is in a superior position to withstand the adverse effects
of a work stoppage, the employer would have nothing to gain and
everything to lose by locking out. Where, on the other hand, an em-
ployer is in a stronger position than the union, the employer can gain
a favorable resolution at the bargaining table without resorting to a
lockout and the lockout would serve no purpose. The employer is likely
to lock out only where the parties are relatively equal in bargaining
strength and the pressure exacted by the lockout will shift the balance
of power to the employer. Under these circumstances, the employer may
be willing to absorb the consequences of a cessation of operations to
gain more favorable bargaining terms. Here and only here does the
employer stand to gain from the lockout. Thus, while the Supreme
Court's decision theoretically could affect virtually every collective
bargaining relationship, it is doubtful that the bargaining lockout will,
in reality, play an important role in collective bargaining. This as-
sumes, of course, that an employer cannot gain the benefits of a lockout
(economic pressure upon the employees) without assuming its burdens
(cessation of operations). If an employer can legally replace his locked
out employees, then the significance of the bargaining lockout would
be considerably increased. In these circumstances, the relative strengths
of the parties to sustain the consequences of a work stoppage would no
longer be the determining factor in dictating whether or not an em-
ployer will lock out. While the Court's decision in American Ship Bldg.
is important, the far more important case will be the one which deals
with the legality of the replacement of locked out employees in a col-
lective bargaining context.
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